I A switch to (¬K, D, I), which would make A 2 and A 3 better off, while leaving A 1 with the same rank of 3. Note that this is the unique Nash equilibrium. K, ¬D, ¬I I All agents could be made better off by switching to (¬K, D, I): A 1 from rank 4 to 3, A 2 from rank 4 to 2, and A 3 from rank 5 to 1.
¬K, D, I
E It is A 3 's unique best outcome, so by the same reasoning as above, it is trivially Pareto-efficient. ¬K, D, ¬I E This is A 2 's unique best outcome. ¬K, ¬D, I I A switch to (¬K, D, I) would make everyone better off: A 1 from rank 5 to 3, A 2 from rank 3 to 2, and A 3 from rank 2 to 1. ¬K, ¬D, ¬I I A switch to (¬K, D, I) would make everyone at least as well off: A 1 from rank 6 to 3, A 2 stays at rank 2, and A 3 from rank 4 to 1.
